Along with the dispersion of the internet, it is a common hypothesis that market transparency will improve on account of the huge amount of easily accessible information. This hypothesis neglects problems of information quality. Under certain circumstances, there are incentives for suppliers to provide false information about their products on the internet, in order to differentiate from the competitors and to increase their sales. In this paper, the theory of economics of information is applied to analyse the specific characteristics of the internet as an information medium. In particular, the authors identify three variables determining the quality of information provided on the internet: (1) the suppliers' competitive positions, (2) the disclosure probability of false information, and (3) the customers' loss of confidence. Subsequently, the authors use a game theoretic approach to analyse the impact of the three variables on information quality to derive insights on market transparency. Keywords: Information medium; internet; market transparency; information quality; supplier behaviour; economics of information; game theory.
information, changing market transparency caused by the internet, and the examination of opportunities to support market analysis and market forecasts with intelligent software agents.
A fabulous introduction
There was once -close to the end of the 20th century -a technological revolution leading to the rapid dispersion of the internet. These new information and communication technologies were accompanied by a few fairy tales. One of them describes the development towards a complete market transparency, based on the great amount of information and the easy accessibility through the internet [1, 2] . For she is the true one that sits by thy side!" [3] The cited Cinderella story unveils the impact of incomplete (market) transparency induced by the incomplete knowledge of the acting persons. The king's son did not know all the maidens in his and the neighbouring kingdoms. To choose his bride, maidens from all over the country were invited to a feast lasting three days. The feast reflects the common idea of a market, where demand and supply meet. Cinderella's two stepsisters were among the invited guests, but Cinderella herself was not invited. However, imagine if Cinderella and the prince had the opportunity to use recent information and communication technologies. If the king's son had published his wish to marry and the announcement of the feast on his royal homepage, do you think the storyline would have been different? According to the presumption of highly rising (market) transparency, the king's son and Cinderella would have found each other without the strenuous search for a maiden whose foot fits into a certain slipper of spangled silk and meeting her accidentally, after having first erroneously chosen her two stepsisters. But this seems questionable and would only occur under certain assumptions.
"Back again! back again! look to the shoe!
The shoe is too small, and not made for you! Prince! prince! look again for thy bride, For she's not the true one that sits by thy side." [3] The first assumption to be mentioned is that Cinderella must have found the announcement on the internet. This primarily implies that she must have had access to the internet. Furthermore, she must have the impulse to search for the prince's announcement or come across this accidentally. Considering the huge amount of information on the internet, the latter seems to be very unlikely. However, an intended search also causes problems, even if search engines are applied. Anyone having searched the internet for special information is aware of the problems. If Cinderella had used a very general search term, she would have got thousands of links. Maybe there is even more than one prince looking for a bride and many other announcements of this kind. Finding the right link is often like picking the peas out of the ash-heap, a request Cinderella was only able to respond to with the help of the white doves, turtle doves and other birds. Otherwise, by using a very specific search term there is a great chance of missing important links, for instance if Cinderella searched with a term the prince did not use in his announcement. However, even if Cinderella had found the announcement, maybe she would not have answered. Probably she would have been too shy to respond, as she might never have dreamed of becoming a princess.
From the prince's point of view various problems may also occur. First of all, the internet can only be a powerful source of information and therefore sufficient to base decisions on, if all potential parties are represented. The prince cannot be sure that all proper maidens came across his announcement and replied to him because of the problems mentioned above. The less agents of a certain market -in this case the maidens of his and the neighbouring kingdoms -are present on the internet, the lower is the value of information retrieved from the internet. By choosing a bride among the replies to his announcement, he cannot be sure that there is not a more favourable maiden apart from those on the internet. Therefore, the market is still partly intransparent. But let us suppose the magical scenario that all maidens had read the announcement and had given the prince feedback. Would it be appropriate for him to choose Cinderella firsthand or even find a better match? Probably not. Considering the quality of information on the internet it becomes apparent that the king's son could have been misled by false information. Suppose we have beauteous maidens and less beautiful ones. On the one hand, the latter will not tell the king's son about their less beautiful appearance, because they do not want to hinder themselves. On the other hand, there may be handsome princes and less handsome and glorious ones. The less handsome ones will omit to state this in their announcement for the same reason. Furthermore, there may even be grooms who pretend to be a prince, but in fact they are not. By posting incomplete or even false information the less beautiful maidens and less handsome princes scale down the market transparency, because complete market transparency would reveal their disadvantages. To be more specific, false information can induce two effects:
1 The less beautiful maidens and less glorious princes aim at a competitive advantage by remaining silent about their weaknesses. If there are people who trust the information on the internet, they may be trapped by false information. Even an old and nasty dwarf is able to display himself as a glorious prince on the internet in order to tempt a beautiful maiden to join him in his solitude.
2 If people experience low quality of information on the internet by uncovering lies, they will lose confidence and abstain from using the internet as a source of information. In this case the less beautiful maidens and less handsome princes need no longer fear that their beautiful and handsome opponents will gain an advantage by posting true information.
Taking these notions into account, rising market transparency is threatened by the quality and credibility of information found on the internet.
Information and market transparency in decision making

The internet as a source of information
The term 'transparent' has different meanings. Being 'very clear' and 'easy to recognise and understand' are some synonyms [4] . Market transparency means having an overview of the vital market processes and structures [5, p.41] . From the consumers' perspective this affects especially the knowledge of goods which are intended to meet their needs and requirements [6, p.141] . Thus, the degree of market transparency depends on the set of information individually available to an economic agent. To examine the internet's impact on market transparency we assume that a decision maker uses the internet as an additional source of information. The internet is capable of distributing information with high velocity and accessibility at comparably low costs. However, considering the fairy tale, two problematic aspects occurred. On the one hand search problems may prevent finding a specific piece of information out of the amount of information available in general. This must be approached by developing highly capable search agents to assist users in their search for appropriate information. While research on retrieval algorithms has already been done, further research on the interface between user and agent is necessary. An interactive and easy to handle dialogue is required, so that users can state very precisely in what context they are actually looking for specific information. This will enable the agent to perform an efficient search.
On the other hand research on the quality of information on the internet has to be conducted. Indeed, the internet provides an huge amount of information. However, whether this information is suitable for making decisions depends on the quality of information. In this paper the proportion of true and false information on the internet is termed information quality. As already mentioned, there may be incentives to publish incomplete or false information in order to influence people's decision making. This paper will disregard the search problem and focus on information quality. In particular supplier behaviour in providing information about their offers is surveyed.
Signalling and screening
It is common to conjecture an information asymmetry between the supply and demand sides. While the suppliers know their offered goods or services in detail, the potential customers usually face a lack of information. This leads to quality uncertainty and constricts the efficiency of market mechanisms [7] . Among others, signalling and screening are attempts and practices to overcome this problem [8, pp.3-7] . Signalling and screening means that suppliers provide information and buyers search for information resulting in a transfer of information across the market [9,10, p.38] . This indicates that each economic agent provides information and uses information made available by others in the market. Presuming that signals transfer true information, they will enable better decisions [11, p.141 ] and this reflects the economic value of information [11, p.140] .
In a market each agent tries to conclude profitable transactions. Through signals suppliers primarily intend to increase their sales by influencing consumers' behaviour, instead of being interested in improved market transparency. To increase sales in a buyer's market, suppliers need to make themselves and their offers recognisable and point out favourable aspects [6, p.138; 12, p.729] . Due to information asymmetry opportunistic behaviour may occur. To be more specific, suppliers might lie in order to mislead customers and gain competitive advantages [13, p.239] . In this case the false information implies advantageous product features which actually do not exist, or the signals conceal weak points in the offered product or service.
Consumers need to acquire information (screening) in order to make decisions. In a neoclassical market with homogenous products the buyer only needs to know the different prices (price transparency) to make the 'right' choice [14, p.208] . But if in addition to price differences quality differences also occur, decision making becomes more challenging. If customers are not sure about quality differences, they will need to acquire information to reduce uncertainty and prevent wrong decisions. They may use information on the product or service provided by the supplier, but must be aware of the fact that they can be misled through false information [15, p.433 ]. Therefore, they will also take information from independent third parties into account [13, pp.240f.] . Independent third parties are neutral sources, providing information about certain goods or services without pursuing their own interests in a following transaction (e.g. consumer counselling, product testing organisations, other customers). They have no incentive to provide false information. Imagine a situation in which consumers cannot verify the supplier's information and neutral information is not available. How do customers cope with this situation? On the one hand they depend on the information from the supplier to make a decision. On the other hand they cannot be sure that the considered information is correct and will lead them to make the right decision. If decision makers cannot distinguish between true and false information, they must somehow decide whether to believe or disbelieve certain information, which expresses their confidence in the information quality. There is no theoretical approach to explain how agents check the veracity of a given piece of information. In coming to a decision about its authenticity they take the supplier's possibly opportunistic behaviour into account. Customers may be trapped by false information whenever opportunistic behaviour offers an incentive to suppliers. Among other aspects this depends on the quality of the products on offer.
The importance of product qualities
Nelson and Darby/Karni differentiate between search, experience and credence qualities [12, p.730; 16,17, pp. 68f; see also 13, pp.239f; 15, p.434; 18, p.217]. This distinction is based on the question -at which point in time can a consumer judge a product's quality without cost? Depending on the type of quality the degree of information asymmetry varies and the credibility of information differs. Search qualities can be ascertained by inspection during the search process prior to purchase [12, p.730; 16,17, pp.68f ]. Accordingly, a potential customer can verify the supplier's information about search qualities before making the decision. The disclosure probability (θ), defined as the probability with which the customer discloses that false information is in fact false, equals one (θ =1). Each piece of false information will be recognised by a consumer as untrue. Since false information will be disclosed for sure, suppliers cannot expect to gain an advantage and agree upon a transaction by posting untrue information. In particular, there is no information asymmetry between suppliers and customers. Whenever information on search qualities is published, an improved market transparency can be expected.
Experience qualities cannot be discovered for free until the product is used, which happens generally after the purchase decision [12, p.730; 16,17, pp.68f ]. Accordingly, a potential customer cannot verify information on experience qualities of a certain product prior to purchase. In contrast to search qualities, a particular disclosure probability of false information cannot be predefined. Potential customers will try to assess the truth of given information by using their own former experiences and information posted by independent third parties. Thus, the availability of this surrogate information defines the disclosure probability, which will be between zero and one (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Suppose a supplier provides false information, the consumer's assessments will have different outcomes according to the actual disclosure probability:
1 in the case of θ = 0 the information will not be perceived as false 2 in the case of 0 < θ < 1 some customers will reveal the information as false, others will not 3 if θ = 1, all customers will observe that the information is not true.
From a theoretical point of view we cannot predict how consumers handle information whose verity is not transparent to them. Again former experiences with a comparable product or with the same supplier may influence the credibility assessment.
Credence qualities can neither prior to nor after a purchase be verified for free, i.e. they are always expensive to judge [17, pp.68f ]. Hence, consumers cannot verify information concerning these qualities. Since other customers and independent third parties face the same problem, neutral information is not available to them either. To conclude, the probability of disclosing false information on credence qualities is zero (θ = 0). Suppliers can provide misleading information without having to fear the discovery of their behaviour. But agents acting rationally will anticipate this and will not take such information into account when making purchase decisions. Assuming this agent behaviour, the suppliers' false information will not affect market transparency. On the contrary, if the suppliers cannot expect to gain any advantage by providing true or false information on credence qualities because the potential customers will not rely on them anyway, they will try to provide surrogate information referring to qualities which can be inspected [19] . Table 1 illustrates the described impact of different product qualities on customer behaviour and the changing market transparency.
Table 1
Impact of product qualities on consumer and supplier behaviour
Search Quality Experience Quality Credence Quality
Utilisation of credible information.
No provision of information on credence qualities.
Disclosure of false information
Rational customer behaviour
Changing transparency due to false information
Rational supplier behaviour
Disclosure is possible before the buying decision.
Disclosure is possible only after the buying decision.
Disclosure is not possible.
Utilisation of available information.
No utilisation of disposable information because of the lack of credibility. No change because false information is discovered before the purchase.
Reduction of transparency possible as not all false information will be disclosed.
No change because rational customers will not use the available information.
Misinformation is no reasonable option.
Misinformation could be an advantageous option.
Not revisable search qualities turn into experience qualities.
Supply of revisable surrogates of information on search and experience qualities.
Situation on the internet
Experience qualities are most prominent on the internet.
Search Quality Experience Quality Credence Quality
Disclosure of false information
Rational customer behaviour
Rational supplier behaviour
Situation
Experience qualities on the internet
Information is presented apart from the specified object on the internet. Although this does not change the object's qualities themselves, the process of verification becomes more difficult or even impossible. Search qualities are termed as such because they can be verified by inspection prior to purchase (e.g. the quality of a fabric). Due to the technology and in contrast to the presentation of products in a shop, the presentation on the internet is limited to audio-visual illustration. Hence, other senses cannot be addressed and the verification of qualities through 'smelling', 'feeling' and 'tasting' is not feasible. Even visual characteristics like an object's size and colour are more difficult to evaluate. If a piece of information regarding a search quality is available but the customers are not able to verify this because they are trading via the internet, the search quality takes on the characteristics of an experience quality. This is depicted at the bottom of Table 1 . As a result we expect to find mainly situations which are described by experience qualities on the internet. Therefore, the following game theoretic analysis will focus on supplier behaviour in posting information about experience qualities on the internet.
3 Game-theoretic analysis of information supply
Market model and suppliers' competitive positions
To analyse the behaviour of supplying information we consider:
1 the competitive position of a supplier 2 the disclosure probability of false information 3 the customers' behaviour or reaction if they uncover false information as three variables. As a result the suppliers will choose to provide either true or false information. We suppose a market with two suppliers (N i = 2), namely A and B, who offer their products via the internet. They compete for Q = 100 customers, who intend to buy one unit out of the two offered products. The potential customers are using the information provided on the internet in order to make their buying decisions. The decision criteria is the utility perceived by the customers (P q (U)), assuming that they all have the same utility function. The game lasts one period.
Regarding the competitive positions we consider two situations. It is either assumed that the offers of both suppliers endow the same utility to the customers (U A = U B ) or that supplier A's product is offering a higher utility than B's offer does (U A > U B ).
The impact of true and false information
We consider one piece of information of each supplier concerning an experience quality which is relevant for the consumers' decision. Regarding this experience quality the suppliers can post true or false information. Striving to maximise their profits they will choose between these options. True information given by the suppliers (A r ; Br) connotes that the product's utility is displayed according to the real facts so that potential customers can perceive its true utility (P q (U A (A r )) respectively P q (U B (B r ))). According to the different competitive positions in one half of the games both offers endow the same utility. Provided that both suppliers post true information, the customers will be indifferent towards both offers (Pq(U A (A r )) = P q (U B (B r )) ). Throughout the other half of the games supplier A has a competitive advantage. If both suppliers post true information, the customers will therefore prefer supplier A's offer (P q (U A (A r )) > P q (U B (B r ))).
Alternatively, both suppliers can provide false information (A f ; B f ) to make their offers appear more beneficial. If the customers do not disclose this falseness, they will be defrauded by this information. As intended by the suppliers, the consumers will perceive a higher offer utility in comparison with the true value. Regarding the impact of false information we need to make two assumptions:
1 'Persuasively lying' means that an offer depicted through undisclosed false information appears to endow a higher utility compared to all other offers depicted through true information. As an example assume supplier B informs false, whereas A provides true information. Potential customers who do not disclose the falseness of B's information will prefer this offer because of the higher perceived utility (P q (U A (A f )) < P q (U B (B r ))).
2 'Comparable lying' means that the lie's impact is the same for both suppliers. If both suppliers post false information, their lies are supposed to have the same effect. That is to say that consumers will perceive the same utility for both offers if they do not disclose the falseness of the information. As a result the consumers are indifferent towards both offers (P q (U A (A f )) = P q (U B (B f ))).
Disclosure probability
As mentioned above θ equals the probability that potential consumers disclose false information. Focusing on experience qualities the possible disclosure probability is between zero and one (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). In the analysis we successively assume three different disclosure probabilities (θ = 1; θ = 0; θ = 0.5). We picked θ = 0.5 as an example. The derived results are valid for the whole range of 0 < θ < 1, since the structure of the results stays constant. To examine supplier behaviour it is necessary to consider which disclosure probability they assume for a specific piece of false information. We presume that for both suppliers the disclosure probability is the same and that both suppliers assess the probability correctly.
Customer behaviour
Customers intend to make buying decisions based on the suppliers' information found on the internet and their utility functions, which are assumed to be the same for all. As the customers are aware of the possible falseness of information they try to disclose untrue information by comparing them with independent third parties' information. According to the disclosure probability a share of θ of the customers disclose a piece of false information, whereas the share of (1-θ) do not. All information that is not recognised as being false is perceived as true. Subsequently, the consumers choose the offer with the highest perceived utility (P q (U)). Only in two situations do the consumers have a preference for one of the two offers. Either the suppliers' offers endow different utilities and both suppliers post true information or the preferred supplier posts false information while the other one informs correctly. The latter case is based on the assumption that lies are 'persuasive'. Consumers will be indifferent towards both offers if these endow the same utility and both suppliers provide true information or if both suppliers post false information. The latter case is based on the assumption of 'comparable lying'. If the customers are indifferent, they decide randomly between the offers and both suppliers will acquire the same number of customers.
If a customer discloses deceit, this piece of information will not be considered for making the buying decision. As only one piece of information per supplier is regarded, the customer will refrain from buying from this supplier as this is the customers' way of exerting market power [15, p.434; see also 12, p.730]. If this customer still takes other information found on the internet into account in order to make a buying decision, no loss of confidence in the internet as an information medium as a whole will occur. 'No loss of confidence' is one possible customer characteristic. Only customers who recognise all available suppliers' information on the internet as false will refuse to make a buying decision based on internet information. From the suppliers' point of view these lost customers are non-realised sales quantity (Q nr ). If the suppliers post false information, the extent of non-realised quantity and correspondingly the number of transactions that can be carried out will depend on the disclosure probability. This realised quantity (Q r ) consists of customers who made their decision based on (false) suppliers' information on the internet. The following formula shows how to calculate the realised and non-realised quantities:
( ) In a market with 100 potential customers (Q = 100), two suppliers (N i = 2) who both provide false information, and a disclosure probability of θ = 0.5 the following distribution will be received: 25 customers do not recognise false information. At each case 25 customers recognise supplier A's and 25 recognise supplier B's false information. All these 75 customers make a buying decision using the information on the internet which they do not disclose as false. The remaining 25 customers recognise that suppliers A and B inform falsely and quit, that is to say, they leave the information medium of the internet without making a buying decision. We refer to the explained behaviour pattern as 'without loss of confidence'. In addition to this partial consequence of disclosed false information, there may also be consequences for the whole information medium internet. Therefore, another possible consumer reaction is considered. Instead of disregarding only the particular false informing supplier, consumers may lose confidence in all non-revisable information on the internet after disclosing one piece of false information. This behaviour pattern is termed 'with loss of confidence'. Only the potential customers who do not disclose false information at all will make their purchase decisions based on the information on the internet. In the case of 'with loss of confidence' the realised and unrealised quantities are calculated as stated below:
( ) Regarding the example mentioned above (Q = 100; n i = 2; θ = 0.5) the assumption 'with loss of confidence' leads to only 25 customers who do not disclose false information and make their purchase decisions based on the information available on the internet (Q r ). The remaining 75 customers recognise one or both pieces of information as false and consequently lose their confidence in the internet as an information channel and refuse to make buying decisions (Q nr ).
Customers who do not make a purchase decision will search for information and product solutions apart from the internet. It is assumed that in addition to the companies who offered their products via the internet (N i ) more suppliers are using traditional distribution channels. Hence, a total of N suppliers (with N ⊂ N i ) compete for customers.
Without analysing the consumers' behaviour in detail each supplier is supposed to yield an equal share in the traditional market. Thus, the N i internet suppliers also have the chance to win back some of the customers who do not make their decision based on the internet information. This additional but small quantity of realised customers will be termed (Q r+ ). 
Numerical analysis
The three influencing factors:
1 the competitive position of a supplier 2 the disclosure probability of false information 3 the customer reactions with or without loss of confidence if they uncover false information can be combined to ten different game situations, which are illustrated in Table 2 . 
Results
Influencing Factors Case
(1) Utility
To explain the results, a couple of games will be described exemplarily. For the cases 1.1 to 1.4 it is assumed that false information will be disclosed by all customers (θ = 1). Thus, in general the suppliers do not have incentives to post false information, except from case 1.4. There, supplier A has a superior offer and the customers react 'with loss of confidence' upon false information. Depending on their choice to post true or false information, the possible four results for the suppliers A and B are displayed in the payoff matrix (Figure 1) . The matrix reveals that supplier A's weak dominant strategy [20] [21] [22] [23] is to post true information. Supplier B's weak dominant strategy is to provide false information, although B is aware that the customers will recognise this. By providing false information, B discredits the internet as an information channel and all customers leave the medium without making a decision. This derogates only supplier A who is no longer able to make his superior offer transparent to the customers. Via traditional distribution channels both suppliers can sell a quantity of Q r+ . The result is shaded in Figure 1 . Assuming a disclosure probability of θ = 0 (cases 2.1 and 2.2) customers cannot reveal false information. Therefore, the variable 'loss of confidence' does not need to be considered. As stated in Table 2 , in both cases both suppliers provide false information. As a result both suppliers yield the same amount of customers. As supplier A offers a superior product in case 2.2 (U A > U B ), supplier B's customers make wrong decisions based on the insufficient information quality on the internet.
For the third set of cases, we assume a disclosure probability of θ = 0.5 and discuss case 3.3 exemplarily. Both suppliers' offers endow the same utility (U A = U B ) and customers react 'with loss of confidence' upon revealed false information. Providing false information is the strict dominant strategy [20] for both suppliers (Figure 2 ). Following these strategies, 75 customers leave the information medium internet without making a decision because they have disclosed at least one piece of false information. This strategic situation is well known as prisoners' dilemma [24, pp.94f.] . Although both suppliers could improve their sales by jointly posting true information, their strict dominant strategies are to inform falsely.
Figure 2
Payoff 
Discussion of results
As stated in the summary table, at least one supplier posts false information in six out of ten cases (see the shaded rows in Table 2 ). According to our analysis the following results can be derived:
First, the higher the disclosure probability, the higher is the quality of information on the internet. The probability of revealing false information is an important factor to determine the quality of available information. This is in accordance to Nelson, who states that experience qualities are more likely to be subject of deceptive information than search qualities [12, p.750 ]. As mentioned above, experience qualities are most prominent on the internet. Suppliers anticipate the possible outcomes and choose their strategies to maximise their individual outcomes. If they post true information, the disclosure probability is unimportant. But in the case of false information supply, customers are split into two groups: Customers who reveal the false information and hereafter disregard that particular supplier and those customers who do not recognise the falseness of a piece of information and therefore perhaps choose the particular supplier. The size of both groups depends on the disclosure probability. Hence, we conclude in accordance with Darby/Karni that a higher customer knowledge (i.e. higher disclosure probability) reduces the optimal amount of fraud [17, p.75f] .
Second, in markets with heterogeneous products or services, the information quality is lower than in markets with homogeneous offers. The assumption of homogeneous products leads to symmetric games and both suppliers will choose the same strategy, depending on the other two influencing factors. However, in five situations supplier B has an inferior offer. If both suppliers provide true information, supplier B will not gain any customers. The lower information quality in cases with heterogeneous products arises because of supplier B's incentive to post false information. Because supplier B does not have to fear any losses, the postage of false information can only improve the competitive position [25] . The opponent's reaction depends on the disclosure probability. If it is low, supplier A is not able to convince the customers of his/her superior offer by providing true information. Therefore, providing false information becomes the dominant strategy and, even then, the supplier will only gain half of the customers, despite offering an advantageous product.
Third, if customers lose their confidence in the whole information-medium internet by revealing false information, the quality of available information becomes lower compared to situations in which customers do not lose their confidence. It may be possible that the loss of customers' confidence is part of a self-regulating market mechanism. If the total sales quantity decreases because potential customers are leaving the internet after having disclosed false information, it may become advantageous for suppliers to provide true information. But the results show the opposite effect because the consequences of leaving customers are distributed unequally. It is the supplier with the superior offer who has to bear them, without having the chance of avoidance. The inferior supplier, who does not gain any customers in a transparent market has two incentives to post false information and create intransparency. First, some customers might stick to this offer as they do not recognise the falsity of the information. Second, there is the chance to win back some of the leaving customers on traditional distribution channels.
Limits of the analysis
According to the analysis, the expected quality of information on the internet is quite bad. In six out of ten cases at least one supplier posts false information. However, most of the customers' decisions are not wrong and in some cases they are right, even though they are based on false information. This contradiction occurs due to the assumption of a market with only two suppliers. Even without considering any information, the likelihood of making a right decision equals 0.5. Furthermore, in five cases the existence of homogeneous products is assumed, therefore customers cannot make a wrong decision. But in situations with heterogeneous products it can be forseen that customers may be induced to make wrong decisions through false information.
The precise distinction between true and false information can only be drawn because of the simplified consideration of only one piece of information. The observable supplier behaviour shows that more than one piece of information is published and hybrid forms of true and false information occur. However, in the end the supplier has to make single decisions on each piece of published information and our analysis is applicable to these decisions. The assumption of 'persuasive lying' describes the supposed impact of false information. Therefore, the suppliers must know the customers' preferences in detail. Nevertheless, these assumptions seem to be justifiable as suppliers will only post false information if they are convinced they can be persuasive and gain an advantage. 'Comparable lying' reflects the assumption that both suppliers have the same ability to lie. As something in-between true and false information suppliers may aim at misleading customers by omitting information on specific aspects [26] .
Because we considered only one period, the analysis does not comprise buyer-seller relationships and the effects of revealed false information in the long run. However, this approach can be substantiated by the competitive conditions on the internet. The entry barriers to electronic markets are considerably low. Therefore, hit-and-run strategies [27, p.336] can become profitable and suppliers may stay in the market for one period only.
It is assumed that the suppliers can regain some of the customers who left the internet without making a buying decision. Therewith we take the existence of alternative distribution channels into account as it seems to influence supplier behaviour. Consider a supplier facing a competitive disadvantage on the internet but for instance having an advantage of location in the traditional market. This supplier has an even bigger incentive to lower transparency and to decrease the customers' confidence in the internet as a reliable source of information. Otherwise, it can be argued that customers who revealed false information provided by a certain supplier will recognise this supplier in the traditional markets and continue to refuse the specific offer. Therefore, and because of a possible higher number of suppliers in traditional markets, only a small quantity of regained customers is assumed (Q r+ ).
Due to the applied assumptions further aspects of research are excluded from this analysis. Taking the amount of available information on the internet and the described search problems into account, it is very unlikely that all customers know all suppliers and find the provided information. Furthermore, suppliers will not estimate the disclosure probability correctly and maybe competitors have individually different probabilities. Accordingly, new options to opportunistic behaviour emerge. In general, information provided by independent third parties may be more easily accessible via the internet and may increase the disclosure probability.
Conclusion
The huge amount of information available on the internet alone is not sufficient to conclude an improving market transparency in general. It is possible that the internet as a channel of information leads to a better matching of kings' sons with princesses and is able to increase the transparency in the market for lonely hearts so that all can live happily ever after. But it is obvious that this depends on the quality of information available on the internet. Under certain conditions, such as a low disclosure probability of false information, markets with heterogeneous products, and customers losing their confidence, inferior suppliers of goods or services gain from intransparent markets. This is the reason why incentives to post false information about the offers' qualities emerge. Especially, the ability to verify information on the internet is low compared to traditional distribution channels, as the information and the described object are separated. This leads to the conclusion that under the described conditions false information is available on the internet and users of this information cannot be expected to make better decisions. At present, there is a lack of institutions to prevent the publishing of false information or sufficient methods to differentiate effectively between true and false information, i.e. separating peas and cinders as Cinderella did with the help of her flying friends. Due to the presented analysis it is possible to figure out markets which need to be ruled by institutions and our approach may also be suggested to analyse the impact of institutions.
